GOOD
good
This incident has been resolved. Thank you for your patience and understanding as we addressed this issue. A detailed root cause analysis will be shared as soon as it is available.
Mar 06, 11:28 PM UTC
minor
Webhooks is operating normally.
Mar 06, 11:28 PM UTC
minor
We have deployed a fix and are observing a full recovery. The affected endpoint was the webhook deliveries API (https://docs.github.com/en/rest/repos/webhooks?apiVersion=2022-11-28#list-deliveries-for-a-repository-webhook) and its organization and integration variants. We will continue monitoring to confirm stability.
Mar 06, 11:26 PM UTC
minor
We are preparing a new mitigation for the issue affecting the webhook deliveries API (https://docs.github.com/en/rest/repos/webhooks?apiVersion=2022-11-28#list-deliveries-for-a-repository-webhook) and its organization and integration variants. Overall impact remains low, with under 1% of requests failing for a subset of customers.
Mar 06, 10:35 PM UTC
minor
The previous mitigation did not resolve the issue. We are investigating further. The affected endpoint is the webhook deliveries API (https://docs.github.com/en/rest/repos/webhooks?apiVersion=2022-11-28#list-deliveries-for-a-repository-webhook) and its organization and integration variants. Overall impact remains low, with under 1% of requests failing for a subset of customers.
Mar 06, 9:34 PM UTC
minor
We have deployed a fix for the issue causing some users to experience intermittent failures when accessing the Webhooks API and configuration pages. We are monitoring to confirm full recovery.
Mar 06, 8:18 PM UTC
minor
We continue working on mitigations to restore service.
Mar 06, 7:39 PM UTC
minor
We continue working on mitigations to restore service.
Mar 06, 7:07 PM UTC
minor
We continue working on mitigations to restore service.
Mar 06, 6:39 PM UTC
minor
We continue working on mitigations to restore full service.
Mar 06, 6:07 PM UTC
minor
Our engineers have identified the root cause and are actively implementing mitigations to restore full service.
Mar 06, 5:43 PM UTC
minor
This problem is impacting less than 1% of UI and webhook API calls.
Mar 06, 5:19 PM UTC
minor
We are investigating an issue affecting a subset of customers experiencing errors when viewing webhook delivery histories and retrying webhook deliveries. UI and webhook API is impacted. Engineers have identified the cause and are actively working on mitigation.
Mar 06, 5:12 PM UTC
minor
We are investigating reports of degraded performance for Webhooks
Mar 06, 4:58 PM UTC
good
This incident has been resolved. Thank you for your patience and understanding as we addressed this issue. A detailed root cause analysis will be shared as soon as it is available.
Mar 05, 11:55 PM UTC
major
We are close to full recovery. Actions and dependent services should be functioning normally now.
Mar 05, 11:40 PM UTC
major
Actions is experiencing degraded performance. We are continuing to investigate.
Mar 05, 11:37 PM UTC
major
Actions and dependent services, including Pages, are recovering.
Mar 05, 11:15 PM UTC
major
We applied a mitigation and we should see a recovery soon.
Mar 05, 11:00 PM UTC
major
Actions is experiencing degraded availability. We are continuing to investigate.
Mar 05, 10:54 PM UTC
major
We are investigating reports of degraded performance for Actions
Mar 05, 10:53 PM UTC
good
On Mar 5, 2026, between 16:24 UTC and 19:30 UTC, Actions was degraded. During this time, 95% of workflow runs failed to start within 5 minutes with an average delay of 30 minutes and 10% workflow runs failed with an infrastructure error. This was due to Redis infrastructure updates that were being rolled out to production to improve our resiliency. These changes introduced a set of incorrect configuration change into our Redis load balancer causing internal traffic to be routed to an incorrect host leading to two incidents.

We mitigated this incident by correcting the misconfigured load balancer. Actions jobs were running successfully starting at 17:24 UTC. The remaining time until we closed the incident was burning through the queue of jobs.

We immediately rolled back the updates that were a contributing factor and have frozen all changes in this area until we have completed follow-up work from this. We are working to improve our automation to ensure incorrect configuration changes are not able to propagate through our infrastructure. We are also working on improved alerting to catch misconfigured load balancers before it becomes an incident. Additionally, we are updating the Redis client configuration in Actions to improve resiliency to brief cache interruptions.
Mar 05, 7:30 PM UTC
major
Webhooks is operating normally.
Mar 05, 7:17 PM UTC
major
Actions is operating normally.
Mar 05, 7:05 PM UTC
major
Actions is now fully recovered.
Mar 05, 6:59 PM UTC
major
The queue of requested Actions jobs continues to make progress. Job delays are now approximately 6 minutes and continuing to decrease.
Mar 05, 6:15 PM UTC
major
We are back to queueing Actions workflow runs at nominal rates and we are monitoring the clearing of queued runs during the incident.
Mar 05, 5:48 PM UTC
major
We have applied mitigations for connection failures across backend resources and we are observing a recovery in queueing Actions workflow runs.
Mar 05, 5:25 PM UTC
major
We are observing delays in queuing Actions workflow runs. We’re still investigating the causes of these delays.
Mar 05, 4:52 PM UTC
major
Webhooks is experiencing degraded availability. We are continuing to investigate.
Mar 05, 4:47 PM UTC
major
Actions is experiencing degraded availability. We are continuing to investigate.
Mar 05, 4:41 PM UTC
major
We are investigating reports of degraded performance for Actions
Mar 05, 4:35 PM UTC
good
On March 5, 2026, between 12:53 UTC and 13:35 UTC, the Copilot mission control service was degraded. This resulted in empty responses returned for users' agent session lists across GitHub web surfaces. Impacted users were unable to see their lists of current and previous agent sessions in GitHub web surfaces. This was caused by an incorrect database query that falsely excluded records that have an absent field.

We mitigated the incident by rolling back the database query change. There were no data alterations nor deletions during the incident.

To prevent similar issues in the future, we're improving our monitoring depth to more easily detect degradation before changes are fully rolled out.
Mar 05, 1:30 AM UTC
minor
Copilot coding agent mission control is fully restored. Tasks are now listed as expected.
Mar 05, 1:30 AM UTC
minor
Users were temporarily unable to see tasks listed in mission control surfaces. The ability to submit new tasks, view existing tasks via direct link, or manage tasks was unaffected throughout. A revert is currently being deployed and we are seeing recovery.
Mar 05, 1:21 AM UTC
minor
We are investigating reports of impacted performance for some GitHub services.
Mar 05, 1:13 AM UTC
good
This incident has been resolved. Thank you for your patience and understanding as we addressed this issue. A detailed root cause analysis will be shared as soon as it is available.
Mar 05, 1:13 AM UTC
minor
The issues with our upstream model provider have been resolved, and gpt-5.3-codex is once again available in Copilot Chat and across IDE integrations. We will continue monitoring to ensure stability, but mitigation is complete.
Mar 05, 1:13 AM UTC
minor
We are experiencing degraded availability for the gpt-5.3-codex model in Copilot Chat, VS Code and other Copilot products. This is due to an issue with an upstream model provider. We are working with them to resolve the issue.

Mar 05, 12:53 AM UTC
minor
We are investigating reports of degraded performance for Copilot
Mar 05, 12:47 AM UTC
good
On March 3, 2026, between 19:44 UTC and 21:05 UTC, some GitHub Copilot users reported that the Claude Opus 4.6 Fast model was no longer available in their IDE model selection. After investigation, we confirmed that this was caused by enterprise administrators adjusting their organization's model policies, which correctly removed the model for users in those organizations. No users outside the affected organizations lost access.

We confirmed that the Copilot settings were functioning as designed, and all expected users retained access to the model. The incident was resolved once we verified that the change was intentional and no platform regression had occurred.
Mar 03, 9:11 PM UTC
minor
We believe that all expected users still have access to Claude Opus 4.6. We confirm that no users have lost access.
Mar 03, 9:05 PM UTC
minor
We are investigating reports of degraded performance for Copilot
Mar 03, 8:31 PM UTC
good
On March 3, 2026, between 18:46 UTC and 20:09 UTC, GitHub experienced a period of degraded availability impacting GitHub.com, the GitHub API, GitHub Actions, Git operations, GitHub Copilot, and other dependent services. At the peak of the incident, GitHub.com request failures reached approximately 40%. During the same period, approximately 43% of GitHub API requests failed. Git operations over HTTP had an error rate of approximately 6%, while SSH was not impacted. GitHub Copilot requests had an error rate of approximately 21%. GitHub Actions experienced less than 1% impact.

This incident shared the same underlying cause as an incident in early February where we saw a large volume of writes to the user settings caching mechanism. While deploying a change to reduce the burden of these writes, a bug caused every user’s cache to expire, get recalculated, and get rewritten. The increased load caused replication delays that cascaded down to all affected services. We mitigated this issue by immediately rolling back the faulty deployment.

We understand these incidents disrupted the workflows of developers. While we have made substantial, long-term investments in how GitHub is built and operated to improve resilience, we acknowledge we have more work to do. Getting there requires deep architectural work that is already underway, as well as urgent, targeted improvements. We are taking the following immediate steps:

- We have added a killswitch and improved monitoring to the caching mechanism to ensure we are notified before there is user impact and can respond swiftly.
- We are moving the cache mechanism to a dedicated host, ensuring that any future issues will solely affect services that rely on it.
Mar 03, 8:09 PM UTC
major
We're seeing recovery across all services. We're continuing to monitor for full recovery.
Mar 03, 8:06 PM UTC
major
Actions is operating normally.
Mar 03, 7:55 PM UTC
major
Git Operations is operating normally.
Mar 03, 7:54 PM UTC
major
Git Operations is experiencing degraded availability. We are continuing to investigate.
Mar 03, 7:36 PM UTC
major
We are seeing recovery across multiple services. Impact is mostly isolated to git operations at this point, we continue to investigate
Mar 03, 7:33 PM UTC
major
Copilot is operating normally.
Mar 03, 7:31 PM UTC
major
Pull Requests is operating normally.
Mar 03, 7:31 PM UTC
major
Pull Requests is experiencing degraded performance. We are continuing to investigate.
Mar 03, 7:28 PM UTC
major
Issues is operating normally.
Mar 03, 7:27 PM UTC
major
Webhooks is operating normally.
Mar 03, 7:25 PM UTC
major
Codespaces is operating normally.
Mar 03, 7:25 PM UTC
major
Webhooks is experiencing degraded performance. We are continuing to investigate.
Mar 03, 7:24 PM UTC
major
Issues is experiencing degraded performance. We are continuing to investigate.
Mar 03, 7:23 PM UTC
major
We've identified the issue and have applied a mitigation. We're seeing recovery of services. We continue to montitor for full recovery.
Mar 03, 7:17 PM UTC
major
API Requests is operating normally.
Mar 03, 7:15 PM UTC
major
API Requests is experiencing degraded performance. We are continuing to investigate.
Mar 03, 7:14 PM UTC
major
Codespaces is experiencing degraded performance. We are continuing to investigate.
Mar 03, 7:11 PM UTC
major
Pull Requests is experiencing degraded availability. We are continuing to investigate.
Mar 03, 7:05 PM UTC
major
Webhooks is experiencing degraded availability. We are continuing to investigate.
Mar 03, 7:04 PM UTC
major
We're seeing some service degradation across GitHub services. We're currently investigating impact.
Mar 03, 7:03 PM UTC
major
Webhooks is experiencing degraded performance. We are continuing to investigate.
Mar 03, 7:02 PM UTC
major
Pull Requests is experiencing degraded performance. We are continuing to investigate.
Mar 03, 7:00 PM UTC
major
API Requests is experiencing degraded availability. We are continuing to investigate.
Mar 03, 7:00 PM UTC
major
We are investigating reports of degraded availability for Actions, Copilot and Issues
Mar 03, 6:59 PM UTC
good
Between March 2, 21:42 UTC and March 3, 05:54 UTC project board updates, including adding new issues, PRs, and draft items to boards, were delayed from 30 minutes to over 2 hours, as a large backlog of messages accumulated in the Projects data denormalization pipeline.

The incident was caused by an anomalously large event that required longer processing time than expected. Processing this message exceeded the Kafka consumer heartbeat timeout, triggering repeated consumer group rebalances. As a result, the consumer group was unable to make forward progress, creating head-of-line blocking that delayed processing of subsequent project board updates.

We mitigated the issue by deploying a targeted fix that safely bypassed the offending message and allowed normal message consumption to resume. Consumer group stability recovered at 04:10 UTC, after which the backlog began draining. All queued messages were fully processed by 05:53 UTC, returning project board updates to normal processing latency.

We have identified several follow-up improvements to reduce the likelihood and impact of similar incidents in the future, including improved monitoring and alerting, as well as introducing limits for unusually large project events.
Mar 03, 5:54 AM UTC
minor
This incident has been resolved. Project board updates are now processing in near-real-time.
Mar 03, 5:53 AM UTC
minor
The backlog of delayed updates is expected to fully clear within approximately 1 hour, after which project board updates will return to near-real-time.
Mar 03, 4:36 AM UTC
minor
The fix has been deployed and processing speeds have returned to normal. There is a backlog of delayed updates that will continue to be worked through — we're estimating how long that will take and will provide an update in the next 60 minutes.
Mar 03, 4:17 AM UTC
minor
The fix is still building and is expected to deploy within 60 minutes. The current delay for GitHub Projects updates has increased to up to 5 hours.
Mar 03, 3:22 AM UTC
minor
We're deploying a fix targeting the increased delay in GitHub Projects updates. The rollout should complete within 60 minutes. If successful, the current delay of up to 4 hours should begin to decrease.
Mar 03, 2:27 AM UTC
minor
The delay for project board updates has increased to up to 3 hours. We've identified a potential cause and are working on remediation.
Mar 03, 1:40 AM UTC
minor
Project board updates — including adding issues, pull requests, and changing fields such as "Status" — are currently delayed by 1–2 hours. Normal behavior is near-real-time. We're actively investigating the root cause.
Mar 03, 12:52 AM UTC
minor
The impact extends beyond adding issues to project boards. Adding pull requests and updating fields such as "Status" may also be affected. We're continuing to investigate the root cause.
Mar 03, 12:05 AM UTC
minor
Newly added issues are taking 30–60 minutes to appear on project boards, compared to the normal near-real-time behavior. We're investigating the root cause and possible mitigations.
Mar 02, 11:46 PM UTC
minor
Newly added issues can take up to 30 minutes to appear on project boards. We're investigating the cause of this delay.
Mar 02, 11:12 PM UTC
minor
Issues is experiencing degraded performance. We are continuing to investigate.
Mar 02, 11:11 PM UTC
minor
We are investigating reports of impacted performance for some GitHub services.
Mar 02, 11:10 PM UTC
good
On March 2nd, 2026, between 7:10 UTC and 22:04 UTC the pull requests service was degraded. Users navigating between tabs on the pull requests dashboard were met with 404 errors or blank pages.

This was due to a configuration change deployed on February 27th at 11:03 PM UTC. We mitigated the incident by reverting the change.

We’re working to improve monitoring for the page to automatically detect and alert us to routing failures.
Mar 02, 10:04 PM UTC
minor
The issue on https://github.com/pulls is now fully resolved. All tabs are working again.
Mar 02, 10:04 PM UTC
minor
We're deploying a fix for pull request filtering. Full rollout across all regions is expected within 60 minutes.
Mar 02, 9:04 PM UTC
minor
We are experiencing issues with the Pull Requests dashboard that prevent users from filtering their pull requests. We have identified a mitigation and are deploying a fix. We'll post another update by 21:00 UTC.
Mar 02, 8:02 PM UTC
minor
We are seeing a degraded experience when attempting to filter the /pulls dashboard. We are working on a mitigation.
Mar 02, 7:23 PM UTC
minor
We are investigating reports of degraded performance for Pull Requests
Mar 02, 7:11 PM UTC
good
On February 27, 2026, between 22:53 UTC and 23:46 UTC, the Copilot coding agent service experienced elevated errors and degraded functionality for agent sessions. Approximately 87% of attempts to start or interact with agent sessions encountered errors during this period.

This was due to an expired authentication credential for an internal service component, which prevented Copilot agent session operations from completing successfully.

We mitigated the incident by rotating the expired credential and deploying the updated configuration to production. Services began recovering within minutes of the fix being deployed.

We are working to improve automated credential rotation coverage across all Copilot service components, add proactive alerting for credentials approaching expiration, and validate configuration consistency to reduce our time to detection and mitigation of issues like this one in the future.
Feb 27, 11:49 PM UTC
minor
We have identified the cause of the elevated errors and are rolling out a fix to production. We are observing initial recovery in Copilot agent sessions.
Feb 27, 11:45 PM UTC
minor
We are investigating networking issues with some requests to our models.
Feb 27, 11:35 PM UTC
minor
We are investigating a spike in errors in Copilot agent sessions
Feb 27, 11:18 PM UTC
minor
We are investigating reports of degraded performance for Copilot
Feb 27, 11:18 PM UTC
good
Starting February 26, 2026 at 22:10 UTC through February 27, 05:50 UTC, the repository browsing UI was degraded and users were unable to load pages for files and directories with non-ASCII characters (including Japanese, Chinese, and other non-Latin scripts). On average, the error rate was 0.014% and peaked at 0.06% of requests to the service. Affected users saw 404 errors when navigating to repository directories and files with non-ASCII names. This was due to a code change that altered how file and directory names were processed, which caused incorrectly formatted data to be stored in an application cache.

We mitigated the incident by deploying a fix that invalidated the affected cache entries and progressively rolling it out across all production environments.

We are working to improve our pre-production testing to cover non-ASCII character handling, establish better cache invalidation mechanisms, and enhance our monitoring to detect this type of failure mode earlier, to reduce our time to detection and mitigation of issues like this one in the future.
Feb 27, 6:04 AM UTC
minor
We have cleared all caches and everything is operating normally.
Feb 27, 6:03 AM UTC
minor
We have mitigated the issue but are working on invalidating caches in order to fix the issue for all impacted repos.
Feb 27, 5:21 AM UTC
minor
We have performed a mitigation but some repositories may still see issues. We are working on a full mitigation.
Feb 27, 4:17 AM UTC
minor
We are looking into recent code changes to mitigate the error loading some code view pages.
Feb 27, 3:28 AM UTC
minor
We are investigating reports of impacted performance for some GitHub services.
Feb 27, 3:08 AM UTC
good
Between February 26, 2026 UTC and February 27, 2026 UTC, customers hitting the webhooks delivery API may have experienced higher latency or failed requests. During the impact window, 0.82% of requests took longer than 3s and 0.004% resulted in a 500 error response.

Our monitors caught the impact on the individual backing data source, and we were able to attribute the degradation to a noisy neighbor effect due requests to a specific webhook generating excessive load on the API. The incident was mitigated once traffic from the specific hook decreased.

We have since added a rate limiter for this webhooks API to prevent similar spikes in usage impacting others and will further refine the rate limits for other webhook API routes to help prevent similar occurrences in the future.
Feb 27, 12:04 AM UTC
minor
Webhooks is experiencing degraded performance. We are continuing to investigate.
Feb 27, 12:02 AM UTC
minor
We are investigating reports of impacted performance for some GitHub services.
Feb 27, 12:01 AM UTC
good
On February 26, 2026, between 09:27 UTC and 10:36 UTC, the GitHub Copilot service was degraded and users experienced errors when using Copilot features including Copilot Chat, Copilot Coding Agent and Copilot Code Review. During this time, 5-15% of affected requests to the service returned errors.

The incident was resolved by infrastructure rebalancing.

We are improving observability to detect capacity imbalances earlier and enhancing our infrastructure to better handle traffic spikes.
Feb 26, 11:06 AM UTC
minor
Copilot is operating normally.
Feb 26, 11:06 AM UTC
minor
We are investigating reports of degraded performance for Copilot
Feb 26, 10:22 AM UTC
good
On February 25, 2026, between 15:05 UTC and 16:34 UTC, the Copilot coding agent service was degraded, resulting in errors for 5% of all requests and impacting users starting or interacting with agent sessions.

This was due to an internal service dependency running out of allocated resources (memory and CPU). We mitigated the incident by adjusting the resource allocation for the affected service, which restored normal operations for the coding agent service.

We are working to implement proactive monitoring for resource exhaustion across our services, review and update resource allocations, and improve our alerting capabilities to reduce our time to detection and mitigation of similar issues in the future.
Feb 25, 4:44 PM UTC
minor
We are investigating reports of degraded performance for Copilot
Feb 25, 4:38 PM UTC
good
Between 2026-02-23 19:10 and 2026-02-24 00:46 UTC, all lexical code search queries in GitHub.com and the code search API were significantly slowed, and during this incident, between 5 and 10% of search queries timed out. This was caused by a single customer who had created a network of hundreds of orchestrated accounts which searched with a uniquely expensive search query. This search query concentrated load on a single hot shard within the search index, slowing down all queries. After we identified the source of the load and stopped the traffic, latency returned to normal.

To avoid this situation occurring again in the future, we are making a number of improvements to our systems, including: improved rate limiting that accounts for highly skewed load on hot shards, improved system resilience for when a small number of shards time out, improved tooling to recognize abusive actors, and capabilities that will allow us to shed load on a single shard in emergencies.
Feb 24, 12:46 AM UTC
minor
We have identified a cause for the latency and timeouts and have implemented a fix. We are observing initial recovery now.
Feb 24, 12:38 AM UTC
minor
Customers using code search continue to see increased latency and timeout errors. We are working to mitigate issues on the affected shard.
Feb 23, 11:10 PM UTC
minor
Elevated latency and timeouts for code search is isolated to a single shard experiencing elevated CPU. We are taking steps to isolate and mitigate the affected shard.
Feb 23, 10:22 PM UTC
minor
Elevated latency and timeouts for code search is isolated to a single shard experiencing elevated CPU. We are continuing to investigate the cause and steps to mitigate.
Feb 23, 9:18 PM UTC
minor
We are continuing to investigate elevated latency and timeouts for code search.
Feb 23, 8:33 PM UTC
minor
We are investigating reports of impacted performance for some GitHub services.
Feb 23, 7:59 PM UTC
good
On February 23, 2026, between 21:01 UTC and 21:30 UTC the Search service experienced degraded performance, resulting in an average of 3.5% of search requests for Issues and Pull Requests being rejected. During this period, updates to Issues and Pull Requests may not have been immediately reflected in search results.

During a routine migration, we observed a spike in internal traffic due to a configuration change in our search index. We were alerted to the increase in traffic as well as the increase in error rates and rolled back to the previous stable index.

We are working to enable more controlled traffic shifting when promoting a new index to allow us to detect potential limitations earlier and ensure these operations succeed in a more controlled manner.
Feb 23, 9:30 PM UTC
minor
Some customers are seeing timeout errors when searching for issues or pull requests. Team is currently investigating a fix.
Feb 23, 9:24 PM UTC
minor
We are investigating reports of degraded performance for Issues and Pull Requests
Feb 23, 9:16 PM UTC
good
On February 23, 2026, between 15:00 UTC and 17:00 UTC, GitHub Actions experienced degraded performance. During the time, 1.8% of Actions workflow runs experienced delayed starts with an average delay of 15 minutes. The issue was caused by a connection rebalancing event in our internal load balancing layer, which temporarily created uneven traffic distribution across sites and led to request throttling.

To prevent recurrence, we are tuning connection rebalancing behavior to spread client reconnections more gradually during load balancer reloads. We are also evaluating improvements to site-level traffic affinity to eliminate the uneven distribution at its source. We have overprovisioned critical paths to prevent any impact if a similar event occurs before those workstreams finish. Finally, we are enhancing our monitoring to detect capacity imbalances proactively.
Feb 23, 5:03 PM UTC
minor
We are investigating reports of degraded performance for Actions
Feb 23, 4:17 PM UTC
good
On February 23, 2026, between 14:45 UTC and 16:19 UTC, the Copilot service was degraded for Claude Haiku 4.5 model. On average, 6% of the requests to this model failed due to an issue with an upstream provider. During this period, automated model degradation notifications directed affected users to alternative models. No other models were impacted. The upstream provider identified and resolved the issue on their end.
We are working to improve automatic model failover mechanisms to reduce our time to mitigation of issues like this one in the future.
Feb 23, 4:19 PM UTC
minor
Copilot is operating normally.
Feb 23, 3:59 PM UTC
minor
The issues with our upstream model provider have been resolved, and Haiku 4.5 is once again available in Copilot Chat and across IDE integrations.

We will continue monitoring to ensure stability, but mitigation is complete.
Feb 23, 3:59 PM UTC
minor
Our provider has recovered and we are not seeing errors but we are awaiting a signal from them that the issue will not regress before we go green.
Feb 23, 3:13 PM UTC
minor
We are experiencing degraded availability for the Haiku 4.5 model in Copilot Chat, VS Code and other Copilot products. This is due to an issue with an upstream model provider. We are working with them to resolve the issue.

Other models are available and working as expected.
Feb 23, 2:56 PM UTC
minor
We are investigating reports of degraded performance for Copilot
Feb 23, 2:56 PM UTC
good
On February 20, 2026, between 17:45 UTC and 20:41 UTC, 4.2% of workflows running on GitHub Larger Hosted Runners were delayed by an average of 18 minutes. Standard, Mac, and Self-Hosted Runners were not impacted.

The delays were caused by communication failures between backend services for one deployment of larger runners. Those failures prevented expected automated scaling and provisioning of larger hosted runner capacity within that deployment. This was mitigated when the affected infrastructure was recycled, larger runner pools in the affected deployment successfully scaled up, and queued jobs processed.

We are working to improve the time to detect and diagnose this class of failures and improve the performance of recovery mechanisms for this degraded network state. In addition, we have architectural changes underway that will enable other deployments to pick up work in similar situations, so there is no customer impact due to deployment-specific infrastructure issues like this.
Feb 20, 8:41 PM UTC
minor
The team continues to investigate issues with some larger runner jobs being queued for a long time. We are though seeing improvement in the queue times. We will continue providing updates on the progress towards mitigation.
Feb 20, 8:36 PM UTC
minor
We are investigating reports of degraded performance for Larger Hosted Runners
Feb 20, 8:01 PM UTC
minor
We are investigating reports of impacted performance for some GitHub services.
Feb 20, 8:00 PM UTC
good
On February 20, 2026, between 07:30 UTC and 11:21 UTC, the Copilot service experienced a degradation of the GPT 5.1 Codex model. During this time period, users encountered a 4.5% error rate when using this model. No other models were impacted.
The issue was resolved by a mitigation put in place by the external model provider. GitHub is working with the external model provider to further improve the resiliency of the service to prevent similar incidents in the future.
Feb 20, 11:41 AM UTC
minor
The issues with our upstream model provider have been resolved, and GPT 5.1 Codex is once again available in Copilot Chat and across IDE integrations [VSCode, Visual Studio, JetBrains].
We will continue monitoring to ensure stability, but mitigation is complete.
Feb 20, 11:19 AM UTC
minor
We are still experiencing degraded availability for the GPT 5.1 Codex model in Copilot Chat, VS Code and other Copilot products. This is due to an issue with an upstream model provider. We are working with them to resolve the issue.

Feb 20, 10:36 AM UTC
minor
We are experiencing degraded availability for the GPT 5.1 Codex model in Copilot Chat, VS Code and other Copilot products. This is due to an issue with an upstream model provider. We are working with them to resolve the issue.
Other models are available and working as expected.
Feb 20, 10:02 AM UTC
minor
We are investigating reports of degraded performance for Copilot
Feb 20, 10:02 AM UTC
good
This incident has been resolved. Thank you for your patience and understanding as we addressed this issue. A detailed root cause analysis will be shared as soon as it is available.
Feb 18, 7:20 PM UTC
minor
We have seen significant recovery in merge queue we are continuing to monitor for any other degraded services.
Feb 18, 7:18 PM UTC
minor
We are investigating reports of issues with merge queue. We will continue to keep users updated on progress towards mitigation.
Feb 18, 6:27 PM UTC
minor
Pull Requests is experiencing degraded performance. We are continuing to investigate.
Feb 18, 6:26 PM UTC
minor
We are investigating reports of impacted performance for some GitHub services.
Feb 18, 6:25 PM UTC
good
On February 17, 2026, between 17:07 UTC and 19:06 UTC, some customers experienced intermittent authentication failures affecting GitHub Actions, parts of Git operations, and other authentication-dependent requests. On average, the Actions error rate was approximately 0.6% of affected API requests. Git operations ssh read error rate was approximately 0.29%, while ssh write and http operations were not impacted. During the incident, a subset of requests failed due to token verification lookups intermittently failing, leading to 401 errors and degraded reliability for impacted workflows.

The issue was caused by elevated replication lag in the token verification database cluster. In the days leading up to the incident, the token store’s write volume grew enough to exceed the cluster’s available capacity. Under peak load, older replica hosts were unable to keep up, replica lag increased, and some token lookups became inconsistent, resulting in intermittent authentication failures.

We mitigated the incident by adjusting the database replica topology to route reads away from lagging replicas and by adding/bringing additional replica capacity online. Service health improved progressively after the change, with GitHub Actions recovering by ~19:00 UTC and the incident resolved at 19:06 UTC.

We are working to prevent recurrence by improving the resilience and scalability of our underlying token verification data stores to better handle continued growth.
Feb 17, 7:06 PM UTC
minor
We are continuing to monitor the mitigation and continuing to see signs of recovery.
Feb 17, 6:55 PM UTC
minor
We have rolled out a mitigation and are seeing signs of recovery and are continuing to monitor.
Feb 17, 6:18 PM UTC
minor
We have identified a low rate of authentication failures affecting GitHub App server to server tokens, GitHub Actions authentication tokens, and git operations. Some customers may experience intermittent API request failures when using these tokens. We believe we've identified the cause and are working to mitigate impact.
Feb 17, 5:46 PM UTC
minor
We are investigating reports of degraded performance for Actions and Git Operations
Feb 17, 5:46 PM UTC
good
On February 13, 2026, between 21:46 UTC and 22:58 UTC (72 minutes), the GitHub file upload service was degraded and users uploading from a web browser on GitHub.com were unable to upload files to repositories, create release assets, or upload manifest files. During the incident, successful upload completions dropped by ~85% from baseline levels. This was due to a code change that inadvertently modified browser request behavior and violated CORS (Cross-Origin Resource Sharing) policy requirements, causing upload requests to be blocked before reaching the upload service.

We mitigated the incident by reverting the code change that introduced the issue.

We are working to improve automated testing for browser-side request changes and to add monitoring/automated safeguards for upload flows to reduce our time to detection and mitigation of similar issues in the future.
Feb 13, 10:58 PM UTC
minor
We are investigating reports of impacted performance for some GitHub services.
Feb 13, 10:30 PM UTC
good
Between February 11th 21:30 UTC and February 12th 15:40 UTC, users in Western Europe experienced degraded quality for all Next Edit Suggestions requests. Additionally, on February 12th, between 18:40 UTC and 20:30 UTC, users in Australia and South America experienced degraded quality and increased latency of up to 500ms for all Next Edit Suggestions requests. The root cause was a newly introduced regression in an upstream service dependency.

The incident was mitigated by failing over Next Edit Suggestions traffic to unaffected regions, which caused the increased latency. Once the regression was identified and rolled back, we restored the impacted capacity. We have improved our quality analysis tooling and are working on more robust quality impact alerting to accelerate detection of these issues in the future.
Feb 12, 8:34 PM UTC
minor
Next Edit Suggestions availability is recovering. We are continuing to monitor until fully restored.
Feb 12, 7:59 PM UTC
minor
We are experiencing degraded availability in Australia and Brazil for Copilot completions and suggestions. We are working to resolve the issue

Feb 12, 7:18 PM UTC
minor
We are experiencing degraded availability in Australia for Copilot completions and suggestions. We are working to resolve the issue

Feb 12, 6:46 PM UTC
minor
We are investigating reports of impacted performance for some GitHub services.
Feb 12, 6:36 PM UTC
good
Between February 11th 21:30 UTC and February 12th 15:40 UTC, users in Western Europe experienced degraded quality for all Next Edit Suggestions requests. Additionally, on February 12th, between 18:40 UTC and 20:30 UTC, users in Australia and South America experienced degraded quality and increased latency of up to 500ms for all Next Edit Suggestions requests. The root cause was a newly introduced regression in an upstream service dependency.

The incident was mitigated by failing over Next Edit Suggestions traffic to unaffected regions, which caused the increased latency. Once the regression was identified and rolled back, we restored the impacted capacity. We have improved our quality analysis tooling and are working on more robust quality impact alerting to accelerate detection of these issues in the future.
Feb 12, 4:50 PM UTC
minor
We are experiencing degraded availability in Western Europe for Copilot completions and suggestions. We are working to resolve the issue.

Feb 12, 3:33 PM UTC
minor
We are experiencing degraded availability in some regions for Copilot completions and suggestions. We are working to resolve the issue.
Feb 12, 2:08 PM UTC
minor
We are investigating reports of impacted performance for some GitHub services.
Feb 12, 2:06 PM UTC
good
From Feb 12, 2026 09:16:00 UTC to Feb 12, 2026 11:01 UTC, users attempting to download repository archives (tar.gz/zip) that include Git LFS objects received errors. Standard repository archives without LFS objects were not affected. On average, the archive download error rate was 0.0042% and peaked at 0.0339% of requests to the service. This was caused by deploying a corrupt configuration bundle, resulting in missing data used for network interface connections by the service.

We mitigated the incident by applying the correct configuration to each site. We have added checks for corruption in this deployment, and will add auto-rollback detection for this service to prevent issues like this in the future.
Feb 12, 11:12 AM UTC
major
We have resolved the issue and are seeing full recovery.
Feb 12, 11:01 AM UTC
major
We are investigating an issue with downloading repository archives that include Git LFS objects.
Feb 12, 10:39 AM UTC
major
We are investigating reports of impacted performance for some GitHub services.
Feb 12, 10:38 AM UTC
good
On February 12, 2026, between 00:51 UTC and 09:35 UTC, users attempting to create or resume Codespaces experienced elevated failure rates across Europe, Asia and Australia, peaking at a 90% failure rate.

The disconnects were triggered by a bad configuration rollout in a core networking dependency, which led to internal resource provisioning failures. We are working to improve our alerting thresholds to catch issues before they impact customers and strengthening rollout safeguards to prevent similar incidents.
Feb 12, 9:56 AM UTC
major
Recovery looks consistent with Codespaces creating and resuming successfully across all regions.

Thank you for your patience.
Feb 12, 9:56 AM UTC
major
Codespaces is experiencing degraded performance. We are continuing to investigate.
Feb 12, 9:42 AM UTC
major
We are seeing widespread recovery across all our regions.

We will continue to monitor progress and will resolve the incident when we are confident on durable recovery.
Feb 12, 9:39 AM UTC
major
We have identified the issue causing Codespace create/resume actions to fail and are applying a fix. This is estimated to take ~2 hours to complete but impact will begin to reduce sooner than that.

We will continue to monitor recovery progress and will report back when more information is available.
Feb 12, 9:04 AM UTC
major
We now understand the source of the VM create/resume failures and are working with our partners to mitigate the impact.
Feb 12, 8:32 AM UTC
major
We are seeing an increase in Codespaces creation and resuming failures across multiple regions, primarily in EMEA. Our team are analysing the situation and are working to mitigate this impact.

While we are working, customers are advised to create Codespaces in US East and US West regions via the "New with options..." button when creating a Codespace.

More updates as we have them.
Feb 12, 8:02 AM UTC
major
We are investigating reports of degraded availability for Codespaces
Feb 12, 7:53 AM UTC
good
On February 11 between 16:37 UTC and 00:59 UTC the following day, 4.7% of workflows running on GitHub Larger Hosted Runners were delayed by an average of 37 minutes. Standard Hosted and self-hosted runners were not impacted.

This incident was caused by capacity degradation in Central US for Larger Hosted Runners. Workloads not pinned to that region were picked up by other regions, but were delayed as those regions became saturated. Workloads configured with private networking in that region were delayed until compute capacity in that region recovered. The issue was mitigated by rebalancing capacity across internal and external workloads and general increases in capacity in affected regions to speed recovery.

In addition to working with our compute partners on the core capacity degradation, we are working to ensure other regions are better able to absorb load with less delay to customer workloads. For pinned workflows using private networking, we are shipping support soon for customers to failover if private networking is configured in a paired region.
Feb 12, 12:59 AM UTC
minor
Actions is experiencing capacity constraints with larger hosted runners, leading to high wait times. Standard hosted labels and self-hosted runners are not impacted.

The issue is mitigated and we are monitoring recovery.
Feb 11, 9:33 PM UTC
minor
We're continuing to work toward mitigation with our capacity provider, and adding capacity.
Feb 11, 7:37 PM UTC
minor
Actions is experiencing capacity constraints with larger hosted runners, leading to high wait times. Standard hosted labels and self-hosted runners are not impacted.

We're working with the capacity provider to mitigate the impact.
Feb 11, 7:00 PM UTC
minor
We are investigating reports of impacted performance for some GitHub services.
Feb 11, 6:58 PM UTC
good
On February 11, 2026, between 13:51 UTC and 17:03 UTC, the GraphQL API experienced degraded performance due to elevated resource utilization. This resulted in incoming client requests waiting longer than normal, timing out in certain cases. During the impact window, approximately 0.65% of GraphQL requests experienced these issues, peaking at 1.06%.

The increased load was due to an increase in query patterns that drove higher than expected resource utilization of the GraphQL API. We mitigated the incident by scaling out resource capacity and limiting the capacity available to these query patterns.

We're improving our telemetry to identify slow usage growth and changes in GraphQL workloads. We’ve also added capacity safeguards to prevent similar incidents in the future.
Feb 11, 5:15 PM UTC
minor
We've observed recovery for the GraphQL service latency.
Feb 11, 5:13 PM UTC
minor
We're continuing to remediate the service degradation and scaling out to further mitigate the potential for latency impact.
Feb 11, 4:54 PM UTC
minor
We've identified a dependency of GraphQL that is in a degraded state and are working on remediating the issue.
Feb 11, 3:54 PM UTC
minor
We're investigating increased latency for GraphQL traffic.
Feb 11, 3:27 PM UTC
minor
We are investigating reports of degraded performance for API Requests
Feb 11, 3:26 PM UTC
good
On February 11, 2025, between 14:30 UTC and 15:30 UTC, the Copilot service experienced degraded availability for requests to Claude Haiku 4.5. During this time, on average 10% of requests failed with 23% of sessions impacted. The issue was caused by an upstream problem from multiple external model providers that affected our ability to serve requests.

The incident was mitigated once one of the providers resolved the issue and we rerouted capacity fully to that provider. We have improved our telemetry to improve incident observability and implemented an automated retry mechanism for requests to this model to mitigate similar future upstream incidents.
Feb 11, 3:46 PM UTC
minor
Copilot is operating normally.
Feb 11, 3:46 PM UTC
minor
The issues with our upstream model provider have been resolved, and Claude Haiku 4.5 is once again available in Copilot Chat and across IDE integrations.

We will continue monitoring to ensure stability, but mitigation is complete.
Feb 11, 3:46 PM UTC
minor
We are experiencing degraded availability for the Claude Haiku 4.5 model in Copilot Chat, VS Code and other Copilot products. This is due to an issue with an upstream model provider. We are working with them to resolve the issue.
Other models are available and working as expected.
Feb 11, 3:27 PM UTC
minor
We are investigating reports of degraded performance for Copilot
Feb 11, 3:26 PM UTC
good
On February 10th, 2026, between 14:35 UTC and 15:58 UTC web experiences on GitHub.com were degraded including Pull Requests and Authentication, resulting in intermittent 5xx errors and timeouts. The error rate on web traffic peaked at approximately 2%. This was due to increased load on a critical database, which caused significant memory pressure resulting in intermittent errors.

We mitigated the incident by applying a configuration change to the database to increase available memory on the host.

We are working to identify changes in load patterns and are reviewing the configuration of our databases to ensure there is sufficient capacity to meet growth. Additionally, we are improving monitoring and self-healing functionalities for database memory issues to reduce our time to detect and mitigation.
Feb 10, 3:58 PM UTC
minor
Pull Requests is operating normally.
Feb 10, 3:58 PM UTC
minor
We have deployed a mitigation for the issue and are observing what we believe is the start of recovery. We will continue to monitor.
Feb 10, 3:51 PM UTC
minor
We believe we have found the cause of the problem and are working on mitigation.
Feb 10, 3:47 PM UTC
minor
We continue investigating intermittent timeouts on some pages.
Feb 10, 3:33 PM UTC
minor
Pull Requests is experiencing degraded performance. We are continuing to investigate.
Feb 10, 3:08 PM UTC
minor
We are seeing intermittent timeouts on some pages and are investigating.
Feb 10, 3:08 PM UTC
minor
We are investigating reports of impacted performance for some GitHub services.
Feb 10, 3:07 PM UTC
good
GitHub experienced degraded Copilot policy propagation from enterprise to organizations between February 3 at 21:00 UTC through February 10 at 16:00 UTC. During this period, policy changes could take up to 24 hours to apply. We mitigated the issue on February 10 at 16:00 UTC after rolling back a regression that caused the delays. The propagation queue fully caught up on the delayed items by February 11 at 10:35 UTC, and policy changes now propagate normally.

During this incident, whenever an enterprise updated a Copilot policy (including model policies), there were significant delays before those policy changes reached their child organizations and assigned users. The delay was caused by a large backlog in the background job queue responsible for propagating Copilot policy updates.

Our investigation determined the incident was caused by a code change shipped on February 3 that increased the number of background jobs enqueued per policy update, in order to accommodate upcoming feature work. When new Copilot models launched on February 5th and 7th, triggering policy updates across many enterprises, the higher job volume overwhelmed the shared background worker queue, resulting in prolonged propagation delays. No policy updates were lost; they were queued and processed once the backlog cleared.

We understand these delays disrupted policy management for customers using Copilot at scale and have taken the following immediate steps:

1. Restored the optimized propagation path and put tests in place to avoid a regression.
2. Ensured upcoming features are compatible with this design.
3. Added alerting on queue depth to detect propagation backlogs immediately.

GitHub is critical infrastructure for your work, your teams, and your businesses. We are focused on these mitigations and continued improvements so Copilot policy changes propagate reliably and quickly.

Feb 10, 9:57 AM UTC
minor
Copilot is operating normally.
Feb 10, 12:51 AM UTC
minor
We're continuing to address an issue where Copilot policy updates are not propagating correctly for a subset of enterprise users. This may prevent newly enabled models from appearing when users try to access them.

This issue is understand and we are working to get the mitigation applied. Next update in one hour.
Feb 10, 12:26 AM UTC
minor
We're continuing to investigate an issue where Copilot policy updates are not propagating correctly for a subset of enterprise users.

This may prevent newly enabled models from appearing when users try to access them.

Next update in two hours.
Feb 09, 10:09 PM UTC
minor
We're continuing to investigate an issue where Copilot policy updates are not propagating correctly for a subset of enterprise users.

This may prevent newly enabled models from appearing when users try to access them.

Next update in two hours.
Feb 09, 8:39 PM UTC
minor
We're continuing to investigate an issue where Copilot policy updates are not propagating correctly for a subset of enterprise users.

This may prevent newly enabled models from appearing when users try to access them.

Next update in two hours.
Feb 09, 6:49 PM UTC
minor
We're continuing to investigate an issue where Copilot policy updates are not propagating correctly for a subset of enterprise users.

This may prevent newly enabled models from appearing when users try to access them.
Feb 09, 6:06 PM UTC
minor
We're continuing to investigate a an issue where Copilot policy updates are not propagating correctly for all customers.

This may prevent newly enabled models from appearing when users try to access them.
Feb 09, 5:24 PM UTC
minor
We’ve identified an issue where Copilot policy updates are not propagating correctly for some customers. This may prevent newly enabled models from appearing when users try to access them.

The team is actively investigating the cause and working on a resolution. We will provide updates as they become available.
Feb 09, 4:30 PM UTC
minor
We are investigating reports of degraded performance for Copilot
Feb 09, 4:29 PM UTC
good
On February 9, 2026, GitHub experienced two related periods of degraded availability affecting GitHub.com, the GitHub API, GitHub Actions, Git operations, GitHub Copilot, and other services. The first period occurred between 16:12 UTC and 17:39 UTC, and the second between 18:53 UTC and 20:09 UTC. In total, users experienced approximately 2 hours and 43 minutes of degraded service across the two incidents. During both incidents, users encountered errors loading pages on GitHub.com, failures when pushing or pulling code over HTTPS, failures starting or completing GitHub Actions workflow runs, and errors using GitHub Copilot. Additional services including GitHub Issues, pull requests, webhooks, Dependabot, GitHub Pages, and GitHub Codespaces experienced intermittent errors. SSH-based Git operations were not affected during either incident. Our investigation determined that both incidents shared the same underlying cause: a configuration change to a user settings caching mechanism caused a large volume of cache rewrites to occur simultaneously. During the first incident, asynchronous rewrites overwhelmed a shared infrastructure component responsible for coordinating background work, triggering cascading failures. Increased load caused the service responsible for proxying Git operations over HTTPS to exhaust available connections, preventing it from accepting new requests. We mitigated this incident by disabling async cache rewrites and restarting the affected Git proxy service across multiple datacenters. An additional source of updates to the same cache circumvented our initial mitigations and caused the second incident. This generated a high volume of synchronous writes, causing replication delays that cascaded in a similar pattern and again exhausted the Git proxy’s connection capacity, degrading availability across multiple services. We mitigated by disabling the source of the cache rewrites and again restarting Git proxy. We know these incidents disrupted the workflows of millions of developers. While we have made substantial, long-term investments in how GitHub is built and operated to improve resilience, GitHub's availability is not yet meeting our expectations. Getting there requires deep architectural work that is already underway, as well as urgent, targeted improvements. We are taking the following immediate steps: 1. We have already optimized the caching mechanism to avoid write amplification and added self-throttling during bulk updates. 2. We are adding safeguards to ensure the caching mechanism responds more quickly to rollbacks and strengthening how changes to these caching systems are planned, validated, and rolled out with additional checks. 3. We are fixing the underlying cause of connection exhaustion in our Git HTTPS proxy layer so the proxy can recover from this failure mode automatically without requiring manual restarts. GitHub is critical infrastructure for your work, your teams, and your businesses. We're focusing on these mitigations and long-term infrastructure work so GitHub is available, at scale, when and where you need it.
Feb 09, 8:09 PM UTC
major
Actions, Codespaces, Git Operations, Issues, Packages, Pages, Pull Requests and Webhooks are operating normally.
Feb 09, 8:09 PM UTC
major
We are seeing all services have returned to normal processing.
Feb 09, 8:08 PM UTC
major
A number of services have recovered, but we are continuing to investigate issues with Dependabot, Actions, and a number of other services.

We will continue to investigate and monitor for full recovery.
Feb 09, 7:54 PM UTC
major
Codespaces is experiencing degraded performance. We are continuing to investigate.
Feb 09, 7:31 PM UTC
major
We have applied mitigations and are seeing signs of recovery.

We will continue to monitor for full recovery.
Feb 09, 7:29 PM UTC
major
Packages is experiencing degraded performance. We are continuing to investigate.
Feb 09, 7:10 PM UTC
major
Pull Requests is experiencing degraded performance. We are continuing to investigate.
Feb 09, 7:07 PM UTC
major
We are seeing impact to several systems including Actions, Copilot, Issues, and Git.

Customers may see slow and failed requests, and Actions jobs being delayed.

We are investigating.
Feb 09, 7:07 PM UTC
major
Webhooks is experiencing degraded performance. We are continuing to investigate.
Feb 09, 7:07 PM UTC
major
Pages is experiencing degraded performance. We are continuing to investigate.
Feb 09, 7:05 PM UTC
major
Actions is experiencing degraded availability. We are continuing to investigate.
Feb 09, 7:02 PM UTC
major
We are investigating reports of degraded performance for Actions, Git Operations and Issues
Feb 09, 7:01 PM UTC
good
On February 9th notifications service started showing degradation around 13:50 UTC, resulting in an increase in notification delivery delays. Our team started investigating.

Around 14:30 UTC the service started to recover as the team continued investigating the incident. Around 15:20 UTC degradation resurfaced, with increasing delays in notification deliveries and small error rate (below 1%) on UI and API endpoints related to notifications.

At 16:30 UTC, we mitigated the incident by reducing contention through throttling workloads and performing a database failover. The median delay for notification deliveries was 80 minutes at this point and queues started emptying. Around 19:30 UTC the backlog of notifications was processed, bringing the service back to normal and declaring the incident closed.

The incident was caused by the notifications database showing degradation under intense load. Most notifications-related asynchronous workloads, including notifications deliveries, were stopped to try to reduce the pressure on the database. To ensure system stability, a database failover was executed. Following the failover, we applied a configuration change to improve the performance. The service started recovering after these changes.

We are reviewing the configuration of our databases to understand the performance drop and prevent similar issues from happening in the future. We are also investing in monitoring to detect and mitigate this class of incidents faster.
Feb 09, 7:29 PM UTC
minor
We continue observing recovery of the notifications. Notification delivery delays have been resolved.
Feb 09, 7:14 PM UTC
minor
We are continuing to recover from notification delivery delays. Notifications are currently being delivered with an average delay of approximately 15 minutes. We are working through the remaining backlog.
Feb 09, 6:33 PM UTC
minor
We are continuing to recover from notification delivery delays. Notifications are currently being delivered with an average delay of approximately 30 minutes. We are working through the remaining backlog.
Feb 09, 5:57 PM UTC
minor
We are seeing recovery in notification delivery. Notifications are currently being delivered with an average delay of approximately 1 hour as we work through the backlog. We continue to monitor the situation closely.
Feb 09, 5:25 PM UTC
minor
We continue to investigate delays in notification delivery with average delivery latency now nearing 1 hour 20 minutes. We are just now starting to see some signs of recovery.
Feb 09, 4:51 PM UTC
minor
We are investigating notification delivery delays with the current delay being around 50 minutes. We are working on mitigation.
Feb 09, 4:12 PM UTC
minor
We are investigating reports of impacted performance for some GitHub services.
Feb 09, 3:54 PM UTC
good
On February 9, 2026, GitHub experienced two related periods of degraded availability affecting GitHub.com, the GitHub API, GitHub Actions, Git operations, GitHub Copilot, and other services. The first period occurred between 16:12 UTC and 17:39 UTC, and the second between 18:53 UTC and 20:09 UTC. In total, users experienced approximately 2 hours and 43 minutes of degraded service across the two incidents. During both incidents, users encountered errors loading pages on GitHub.com, failures when pushing or pulling code over HTTPS, failures starting or completing GitHub Actions workflow runs, and errors using GitHub Copilot. Additional services including GitHub Issues, pull requests, webhooks, Dependabot, GitHub Pages, and GitHub Codespaces experienced intermittent errors. SSH-based Git operations were not affected during either incident. Our investigation determined that both incidents shared the same underlying cause: a configuration change to a user settings caching mechanism caused a large volume of cache rewrites to occur simultaneously. During the first incident, asynchronous rewrites overwhelmed a shared infrastructure component responsible for coordinating background work, triggering cascading failures. Increased load caused the service responsible for proxying Git operations over HTTPS to exhaust available connections, preventing it from accepting new requests. We mitigated this incident by disabling async cache rewrites and restarting the affected Git proxy service across multiple datacenters. An additional source of updates to the same cache circumvented our initial mitigations and caused the second incident. This generated a high volume of synchronous writes, causing replication delays that cascaded in a similar pattern and again exhausted the Git proxy’s connection capacity, degrading availability across multiple services. We mitigated by disabling the source of the cache rewrites and again restarting Git proxy. We know these incidents disrupted the workflows of millions of developers. While we have made substantial, long-term investments in how GitHub is built and operated to improve resilience, GitHub's availability is not yet meeting our expectations. Getting there requires deep architectural work that is already underway, as well as urgent, targeted improvements. We are taking the following immediate steps: 1. We have already optimized the caching mechanism to avoid write amplification and added self-throttling during bulk updates. 2. We are adding safeguards to ensure the caching mechanism responds more quickly to rollbacks and strengthening how changes to these caching systems are planned, validated, and rolled out with additional checks. 3. We are fixing the underlying cause of connection exhaustion in our Git HTTPS proxy layer so the proxy can recover from this failure mode automatically without requiring manual restarts. GitHub is critical infrastructure for your work, your teams, and your businesses. We're focusing on these mitigations and long-term infrastructure work so GitHub is available, at scale, when and where you need it.
Feb 09, 5:40 PM UTC
major
Pull Requests is operating normally.
Feb 09, 5:40 PM UTC
major
Webhooks is operating normally.
Feb 09, 5:39 PM UTC
major
Actions is operating normally.
Feb 09, 5:37 PM UTC
major
We are seeing recovery across all products and are continuing to monitor service health.
Feb 09, 5:32 PM UTC
major
Pages is operating normally.
Feb 09, 5:29 PM UTC
major
Git Operations is operating normally.
Feb 09, 5:26 PM UTC
major
Issues is operating normally.
Feb 09, 5:25 PM UTC
major
Pages is experiencing degraded performance. We are continuing to investigate.
Feb 09, 5:08 PM UTC
major
We have identified the cause of high error rates and taken steps to mitigate. We see early signs of recovery but are continuing to monitor impact.
Feb 09, 4:58 PM UTC
major
Issues is experiencing degraded performance. We are continuing to investigate.
Feb 09, 4:50 PM UTC
major
Webhooks is experiencing degraded performance. We are continuing to investigate.
Feb 09, 4:40 PM UTC
major
Git Operations is experiencing degraded performance. We are continuing to investigate.
Feb 09, 4:40 PM UTC
major
Actions is experiencing degraded performance. We are continuing to investigate.
Feb 09, 4:22 PM UTC
major
We are seeing intermittent errors on many pages and API requests and are investigating.
Feb 09, 4:21 PM UTC
major
Issues is experiencing degraded availability. We are continuing to investigate.
Feb 09, 4:20 PM UTC
major
We are investigating reports of degraded performance for Pull Requests
Feb 09, 4:19 PM UTC
good
On February 9th, 2026, between 09:16 UTC and 15:12 UTC GitHub Actions customers experienced run start delays. Approximately 0.6% of runs across 1.8% of repos were affected, with an average delay of 19 minutes for those delayed runs.

The incident occurred when increased load exposed a bottleneck in our event publishing system, causing one compute node to fall behind on processing Actions Jobs. We mitigated by rebalancing traffic and increasing timeouts for event processing. We have since isolated performance critical events to a new, dedicated publisher to prevent contention between events and added safeguards to better tolerate processing timeouts.
Feb 09, 3:46 PM UTC
minor
Actions is operating normally.
Feb 09, 3:46 PM UTC
minor
Actions run delays have returned to normal levels.
Feb 09, 3:46 PM UTC
minor
We identified a bottleneck in our processing pipeline and have applied mitigations. We will continue to monitor for full recovery.
Feb 09, 3:26 PM UTC
minor
We continue to investigate an issue causing Actions run start delays, impacting approximately 4% of users.
Feb 09, 2:54 PM UTC
minor
We are investigating an issue with Actions run start delays, impacting approximately 4% of users.
Feb 09, 2:17 PM UTC
minor
We are investigating reports of degraded performance for Actions
Feb 09, 2:17 PM UTC
good
On February 9, 2026, between ~06:00 UTC and ~12:12 UTC, Copilot Coding Agent and related Copilot API endpoints experienced degraded availability. The primary impact was to agent-based workflows (requests to /agents/swe/*, including custom agent configuration checks), where 154k users saw failed requests and error responses in their editor/agent experience. Impact was concentrated among users and integrations actively using Copilot Coding Agent with VS Code.

The degradation was caused by an unexpected surge in traffic to the related API endpoints that exceeded an internal secondary rate limit. That resulted in upstream request denials which were surfaced to users as elevated 500 errors.

We mitigated the incident by deploying a change that increased the applicable rate limit for this traffic, which allowed requests to complete successfully and returned the service to normal operation.

After the mitigation, we deployed guardrails with applicable caching to avoid a repeat of similar incidents. We also temporarily increased infrastructure capacity to better handle backlog recovery from the rate limiting. We're are improving monitoring around growing agentic API endpoints.
Feb 09, 12:12 PM UTC
minor
We are continuing to investigate the degraded availability for Copilot Coding Agent.
Feb 09, 11:14 AM UTC
minor
We are investigating degraded availability for Copilot Coding Agent. We will continue to keep users updated on progress towards mitigation.
Feb 09, 10:04 AM UTC
minor
We are investigating reports of impacted performance for some GitHub services.
Feb 09, 10:01 AM UTC
good
On February 9, 2026, between 07:05 UTC and 11:26 UTC, GitHub experienced intermittent degradation across Issues, Pull Requests, Webhooks, Actions, and Git operations. Approximately every 30 minutes, users encountered brief periods of elevated errors and timeouts lasting roughly 15 seconds each. During the incident window, approximately 1–2% of requests were impacted across these services, with Git operations experiencing up to 7% error rates during individual spikes. GitHub Actions saw up to 2% of workflow runs delayed by a median of approximately 7 minutes due to backups created during these periods.

This was due to multiple resource-intensive workloads running simultaneously, which caused intermittent processing delays on the data storage layer. We mitigated the incident by scaling storage to a larger compute capacity, which resolved the processing delays.

We are working to improve detection of resource-intensive queries, identify changes in load patterns, and enhance our monitoring to reduce our time to detection and mitigation of issues like this one in the future.
Feb 09, 11:26 AM UTC
minor
Actions is operating normally.
Feb 09, 11:26 AM UTC
minor
Issues is operating normally.
Feb 09, 11:26 AM UTC
minor
Webhooks is operating normally.
Feb 09, 11:26 AM UTC
minor
Pull Requests is operating normally.
Feb 09, 11:26 AM UTC
minor
We have identified a faulty infrastructure component and have failed over to a healthy instance. We are continuing to monitor the system for recovery.
Feb 09, 11:11 AM UTC
minor
Git Operations is operating normally.
Feb 09, 11:04 AM UTC
minor
We are continuing to investigate intermittent elevated timeouts across the service.
Feb 09, 10:48 AM UTC
minor
Git Operations is experiencing degraded performance. We are continuing to investigate.
Feb 09, 10:33 AM UTC
minor
We are continuing to investigate intermittent elevated timeouts across the service.
Feb 09, 10:09 AM UTC
minor
We are continuing to investigate intermittent elevated timeouts across the service. Current impact is estimated around 1% or less of requests.
Feb 09, 9:31 AM UTC
minor
Actions is experiencing degraded performance. We are continuing to investigate.
Feb 09, 9:23 AM UTC
minor
We are continuing to investigate intermittent elevated timeouts.
Feb 09, 8:52 AM UTC
minor
We are investigating intermittent latency and errors with Webhooks API, Webhooks UI, and PRs. We will continue to keep users updated on progress towards mitigation.
Feb 09, 8:17 AM UTC
minor
Issues is experiencing degraded performance. We are continuing to investigate.
Feb 09, 8:17 AM UTC
minor
We are investigating reports of degraded performance for Pull Requests and Webhooks
Feb 09, 8:15 AM UTC
good
On February 6, 2026, between 17:49 UTC and 18:36 UTC, the GitHub Mobile service was degraded, and some users were unable to create pull request review comments on deleted lines (and in some cases, comments on deleted files). This impacted users on the newer comment-positioning flow available in version 1.244.0 of the mobile apps. Telemetry indicated that the failures increased as the Android rollout progressed. This was due to a defect in the new comment-positioning workflow that could result in the server rejecting comment creation for certain deleted-line positions.

We mitigated the incident by halting the Android rollout and implementing interim client-side fallback behavior while a platform fix is in progress. The client-side fallback is scheduled to be published early this week. We are working to (1) add clearer client-side error handling (avoid infinite spinners), (2) improve monitoring/alerting for these failures, and (3) adopt stable diff identifiers for diff-based operations to reduce the likelihood of recurrence.
Feb 06, 6:36 PM UTC
minor
Some GitHub Mobile app users may be unable to add review comments on deleted lines in pull requests. We're working on a fix and expect to release it early next week.
Feb 06, 6:36 PM UTC
minor
Pull Requests is operating normally.
Feb 06, 6:04 PM UTC
minor
We're currently investigating an issue affecting the Mobile app that can prevent review comments from being posted on certain pull requests when commenting on deleted lines.
Feb 06, 6:00 PM UTC
minor
We are investigating reports of degraded performance for Pull Requests
Feb 06, 5:49 PM UTC
good
On February 10, 2026, between 10:28 and 11:54 UTC, Visual Studio Code users experienced a degraded experience on GitHub Copilot when using the Claude Opus 4.6 model. During this time, approximately 50% of users encountered agent turn failures due to the model being unable to serve the volume of incoming requests.

Rate limits set too low for actual demand caused the issue. While the initial deployment showed no concerns, a surge in traffic from Europe on the following day caused VSCode to begin hitting rate limit errors. Additionally, a degradation message intended to notify users of high usage failed to trigger due to a misconfiguration. We mitigated the incident by adjusting rate limits for the model.

We improved our rate limiting to prevent future models from experiencing similar issues. We are also improving our capacity planning processes to reduce the risk of similar incidents in the future, and enhancing our detection and mitigation capabilities to reduce impact to customers.
Feb 06, 11:58 AM UTC
minor
Copilot is operating normally.
Feb 06, 11:58 AM UTC
minor
We have increased capacity and are seeing recovery.
Feb 06, 11:57 AM UTC
minor
Opus 4.6 is currently experiencing high demand and we are working on adding capacity.
Feb 06, 11:21 AM UTC
minor
We are investigating reports of degraded performance for Copilot
Feb 06, 11:16 AM UTC
good
On February 3, 2026, between 14:00 UTC and 17:40 UTC, customers experienced delays in Webhook delivery for push events and delayed GitHub Actions workflow runs. During this window, Webhook deliveries for push events were delayed by up to 40 minutes, with an average delay of 10 minutes. GitHub Actions workflows triggered by push events experienced similar job start delays. Additionally, between 15:25 UTC and 16:05 UTC, all GitHub Actions workflow runs experienced status update delays of up to 11 minutes, with a median delay of 6 minutes.

The issue stemmed from connection churn in our eventing service, which caused CPU saturation and delays for reads and writes, with subsequent downstream delivery delays for Actions and Webhooks. We have added observability tooling and metrics to accelerate detection, and are correcting stream processing client configuration to prevent recurrence.
Feb 03, 7:28 PM UTC
minor
Our telemetry shows improvement on latency in job status updates. We will continue monitoring until full recovery.
Feb 03, 6:06 PM UTC
minor
We've applied a mitigation to improve system throughput and are monitoring for reduced latency for job status updates.
Feb 03, 4:51 PM UTC
minor
We are investigating reports of degraded performance for Actions
Feb 03, 4:10 PM UTC
good
On February 3, 2026, between 09:35 UTC and 10:15 UTC, GitHub Copilot experienced elevated error rates, with an average of 4% of requests failing.

This was caused by a capacity imbalance that led to resource exhaustion on backend services. The incident was resolved by infrastructure rebalancing, and we subsequently deployed additional capacity.

We are improving observability to detect capacity imbalances earlier and enhancing our infrastructure to better handle traffic spikes.
Feb 03, 10:56 AM UTC
minor
We are now seeing recovery.
Feb 03, 10:55 AM UTC
minor
We are investigating elevated 500s across Copilot services.
Feb 03, 10:21 AM UTC
minor
We are investigating reports of degraded performance for Copilot
Feb 03, 10:16 AM UTC
good
On February 2, 2026, between 18:35 UTC and 22:15 UTC, GitHub Actions hosted runners were unavailable, with service degraded until full recovery at 23:10 UTC for standard runners and at February 3, 2026 00:30 UTC for larger runners. During this time, Actions jobs queued and timed out while waiting to acquire a hosted runner. Other GitHub features that leverage this compute infrastructure were similarly impacted, including Copilot Coding Agent, Copilot Code Review, CodeQL, Dependabot, GitHub Enterprise Importer, and Pages. All regions and runner types were impacted. Self-hosted runners on other providers were not impacted.

This outage was caused by a backend storage access policy change in our underlying compute provider that blocked access to critical VM metadata, causing all VM create, delete, reimage, and other operations to fail. More information is available at https://azure.status.microsoft/en-us/status/history/?trackingId=FNJ8-VQZ. This was mitigated by rolling back the policy change, which started at 22:15 UTC. As VMs came back online, our runners worked through the backlog of requests that hadn’t timed out.

We are working with our compute provider to improve our incident response and engagement time, improve early detection before they impact our customers, and ensure safe rollout should similar changes occur in the future. We recognize this was a significant outage to our users that rely on GitHub’s workloads and apologize for the impact this had.
Feb 03, 12:56 AM UTC
major
Actions is operating normally.
Feb 03, 12:56 AM UTC
major
Based on our telemetry, most customers should see full recovery from failing GitHub Actions jobs on hosted runners.
We are monitoring closely to confirm complete recovery.
Other GitHub features that rely on GitHub Actions (for example, Copilot Coding Agent and Dependabot) should also see recovery.
Feb 02, 11:50 PM UTC
major
Actions is experiencing degraded performance. We are continuing to investigate.
Feb 02, 11:43 PM UTC
major
Copilot is operating normally.
Feb 02, 11:42 PM UTC
major
Pages is operating normally.
Feb 02, 11:31 PM UTC
major
Our upstream provider has applied a mitigation to address queuing and job failures on hosted runners.
Telemetry shows improvement, and we are monitoring closely for full recovery.
Feb 02, 10:53 PM UTC
major
We continue to investigate failures impacting GitHub Actions hosted-runner jobs.
We're waiting on our upstream provider to apply the identified mitigations, and we're preparing to resume job processing as safely as possible.
Feb 02, 10:10 PM UTC
major
Copilot is experiencing degraded performance. We are continuing to investigate.
Feb 02, 9:27 PM UTC
major
We continue to investigate failures impacting GitHub Actions hosted-runner jobs.
We have identified the root cause and are working with our upstream provider to mitigate.
This is also impacting GitHub features that rely on GitHub Actions (for example, Copilot Coding Agent and Dependabot).
Feb 02, 9:13 PM UTC
major
The team continues to investigate issues causing GitHub Actions jobs on hosted runners to remain queued for extended periods, with a percentage of jobs failing. We will continue to provide updates as we make progress toward mitigation.

Feb 02, 8:27 PM UTC
major
Pages is experiencing degraded performance. We are continuing to investigate.
Feb 02, 7:48 PM UTC
major
The team continues to investigate issues causing GitHub Actions jobs on hosted runners to remain queued for extended periods, with a percentage of jobs failing. We will continue to provide updates as we make progress toward mitigation.
Feb 02, 7:44 PM UTC
major
Actions is experiencing degraded availability. We are continuing to investigate.
Feb 02, 7:43 PM UTC
major
GitHub Actions hosted runners are experiencing high wait times across all labels. Self-hosted runners are not impacted.
Feb 02, 7:07 PM UTC
major
We are investigating reports of degraded performance for Actions
Feb 02, 7:03 PM UTC
good
On February 2, 2026, GitHub Codespaces were unavailable between 18:55 and 22:20 UTC and degraded until the service fully recovered at February 3, 2026 00:15 UTC. During this time, Codespaces creation and resume operations failed in all regions.

This outage was caused by a backend storage access policy change in our underlying compute provider that blocked access to critical VM metadata, causing all VM create, delete, reimage, and other operations to fail. More information is available at https://azure.status.microsoft/en-us/status/history/?trackingId=FNJ8-VQZ. This was mitigated by rolling back the policy change, which started at 22:15 UTC. As VMs came back online, our runners worked through the backlog of requests that hadn’t timed out.

We are working with our compute provider to improve our incident response and engagement time, improve early detection before they impact our customers, and ensure safe rollout should similar changes occur in the future. We recognize this was a significant outage to our users that rely on GitHub’s workloads and apologize for the impact this had.
Feb 03, 12:54 AM UTC
major
Codespaces is operating normally.
Feb 03, 12:54 AM UTC
major
Codespaces is experiencing degraded performance. We are continuing to investigate.
Feb 03, 12:25 AM UTC
major
Codespaces is seeing steady recovery
Feb 02, 11:52 PM UTC
major
Users may see errors creating or resuming codespaces. We are investigating and will provide further updates as we have them.
Feb 02, 8:19 PM UTC
major
We are investigating reports of degraded availability for Codespaces
Feb 02, 8:17 PM UTC
good
From Jan 31, 2026 00:30 UTC to Feb 2, 2026 18:00 UTC Dependabot service was degraded and failed to create 10% of Automated Pull Requests. This was due to a cluster failover that connected to a read-only database.

We mitigated the incident by pausing Dependabot queues until traffic was properly routed to healthy clusters. We’re working on identifying and rerunning all failed jobs during this time.

We’re adding new monitors and alerts to reduce our time to detection and prevent this in the future.
Feb 02, 6:46 PM UTC
major
Dependabot is currently experiencing an issue that may cause scheduled update jobs to fail when creating pull requests.

Our team has identified the problem and deployed a fix. We’re seeing signs of recovery and expect full resolution within the next few hours.
Feb 02, 5:58 PM UTC
major
We are investigating reports of impacted performance for some GitHub services.
Feb 02, 5:41 PM UTC
good
From Feb 2, 2026 17:13 UTC to Feb 2, 2026 17:36 UTC we experienced failures on ~0.02% of Git operations. While deploying an internal service, a misconfiguration caused a small subset of traffic to route to a service that was not ready. During the incident we observed the degradation and statused publicly.

To mitigate the issue, traffic was redirected to healthy instances and we resumed normal operation.

We are improving our monitoring and deployment processes in this area to avoid future routing issues.
Feb 02, 5:43 PM UTC
minor
We’ve observed a low rate (~0.01%) of 5xx errors for HTTP-based fetches and clones. We’re currently routing traffic away from the affected location and are seeing recovery.
Feb 02, 5:42 PM UTC
minor
Git Operations is experiencing degraded performance. We are continuing to investigate.
Feb 02, 5:35 PM UTC
minor
We are investigating reports of impacted performance for some GitHub services.
Feb 02, 5:34 PM UTC
good
Between 2026-01-30 19:06 UTC and 2026-01-30 20:04 UTC, Copilot Coding Agent experienced sessions getting stuck, with a mismatch between the UI-reported session status and the underlying Actions and job execution state. Impacted users could observe Actions finish successfully but the session UI continuing to show in-progress state, or sessions remaining in queued state.

The issue was caused by a feature flag that resulted in events being published to a new Kafka topic. Publishing failures led to buffer/queue overflows in the shared event publishing client, preventing other critical events from being emitted. We mitigated the incident by disabling the feature flag and redeploying production pods, which resumed normal event delivery. We are working to improve safeguards and detection around event publishing failures to reduce time to mitigation for similar issues in the future.
Jan 30, 9:22 PM UTC
minor
Customers may experience misreported Copilot Coding Agent tasks in the GitHub UI. Although the underlying actions are completing as requested, surfaces like Agent Sessions on the GitHub website, or Agent Hub in VS Code, will show that an agent is still working on a task, even if that work has completed.

We are working to understand the root cause and mitigate these discrepancies.
Jan 30, 9:05 PM UTC
minor
We are investigating reports of degraded performance for Actions
Jan 30, 8:59 PM UTC
good
On Jan 28, 2026, between 14:56 UTC and 15:44 UTC, GitHub Actions experienced degraded performance. During this time, workflows experienced an average delay of 49 seconds, and 4.7% of workflow runs failed to start within 5 minutes. The root cause was an atypical load pattern that overwhelmed system capacity and caused resource contention.

Recovery began once additional resources came online at 15:25 UTC, with full recovery at 15:44 UTC. We are implementing safeguards to prevent this failure mode and enhancing our monitoring to detect and address similar patterns more quickly in the future.
Jan 28, 3:54 PM UTC
minor
Actions workflow run starts are delayed. We are actively investigating to find a mitigation.
Jan 28, 3:37 PM UTC
minor
We are investigating reports of degraded performance for Actions
Jan 28, 3:12 PM UTC
good
On Jan 26, 2026, from approximately 14:03 UTC to 23:42 UTC, GitHub Actions experienced job failures on some Windows standard hosted runners. This was caused by a configuration difference in a new Windows runner type that caused the expected D: drive to be missing. About 2.5% of all Windows standard runners jobs were impacted. Re-run of failed workflows had a high chance of succeeding given the limited rollout of the change.

The job failures were mitigated by rolling back the affected configuration and removing the provisioned runners that had this configuration. To reduce the chance of recurrence, we are expanding runner telemetry and improving validation of runner configuration changes. We are also evaluating options to accelerate the mitigation time of any similar future events.
Jan 26, 11:51 PM UTC
minor
At 23:45 UTC we applied a mitigation to take remaining impacted capacity offline and are seeing improvement. We will update again once we've confirmed the issue is resolved.
Jan 26, 11:49 PM UTC
minor
Our investigation into GitHub Actions 4 Core Windows runner failures in public repositories is ongoing.

If you have a failing GitHub Actions run, please retry it and it is likely to succeed.
Jan 26, 11:04 PM UTC
minor
We're continuing to investigate failures in GitHub Actions 4 Core Windows runners in public repositories.

If you have a failing GitHub Actions run, please retry it and it is likely to succeed.
Jan 26, 10:02 PM UTC
minor
Rollback has been completed, but we are still seeing failures on about 11% of GitHub Actions runs on 4 Core Windows runners in public repositories.

If your workflow fails to start, try re-running and it is likely to work a second time.
Jan 26, 9:20 PM UTC
minor
Mitigation for failing GitHub Actions jobs on 4-Core Windows runners is still being mitigated. You should start to see more runs succeeding.
If you do see failing runs, please retry and they might succeed.
Jan 26, 8:10 PM UTC
minor
We've applied a mitigation to unblock running Actions. A regression occurred for Windows runners in public repositories which caused Actions workflows to fail. A mitigation is in place and customers should expect to see resolution soon.

If you have a failing Actions workflow on a Windows runner, please retry and it is likely to work.
Jan 26, 7:32 PM UTC
minor
We are investigating reports of impacted performance for some GitHub services.
Jan 26, 7:25 PM UTC
good
Between January 24, 2026,19:56 UTC and January 25, 2026, 2:50 UTC repository creation and clone were degraded. On average, the error rate was 25% and peaked at 55% of requests for repository creation. This was due to increased latency on the repositories database impacting a read-after-write problem during repo creation. We mitigated the incident by stopping an operation that was generating load on the database to increase throughput.

We have identified the repository creation problem and are working to address the issue and improve our observability to reduce our time to detection and mitigation of issues like this one in the future.

Jan 25, 3:08 AM UTC
minor
The issue has been resolved. We will continue to monitor to ensure stability.
Jan 25, 3:08 AM UTC
minor
Repo creation failure rate increased above 50%. We have mitigated the problem and are monitoring for recovery.
Jan 25, 2:58 AM UTC
minor
We are investigating reports of impacted performance for some GitHub services.
Jan 25, 2:43 AM UTC